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Abstract
Modern processors, e.g., Intel SGX, allow applications to
isolate secret code and data in encrypted memory regions
called enclaves. While encryption effectively hides the
contents of memory, the sequence of address references
issued by the secret code leaks information. This is a
serious problem because these leaks can easily break the
confidentiality guarantees of enclaves.
In this paper, we explore Oblivious RAM (ORAM) de-
signs that prevent these information leaks under the con-
straints of modern SGX processors. Most ORAMs are
a poor fit for these processors because they have high
constant overhead factors or require large private mem-
ories, which are not available in these processors. We
address these limitations with a new hierarchical ORAM
construction, the Pyramid ORAM, that is optimized to-
wards online bandwidth cost and small blocks. It uses a
new hashing scheme that circumvents the complexity of
previous hierarchical schemes.
We present an efficient x64-optimized implementation
of Pyramid ORAM that uses only the processor’s regis-
ters as private memory. We compare Pyramid ORAM
with Circuit ORAM, a state-of-the-art tree-based ORAM
scheme that also uses constant private memory. Pyramid
ORAM has better online asymptotical complexity than
Circuit ORAM. Our implementation of Pyramid ORAM
and Circuit ORAM validates this: as all hierarchical
schemes, Pyramid ORAM has high variance of access la-
tencies; although latency can be high for some accesses,
for typical configurations Pyramid ORAM provides ac-
cess latencies that are 8X better than Circuit ORAM for
99% of accesses. Although the best known hierarchi-
cal ORAM has better asymptotical complexity, Pyramid
ORAM has significantly lower constant overhead fac-
tors, making it the preferred choice in practice.
∗Work done at Microsoft Research; affiliated with University of
Cambridge, UK.
†Work done at Microsoft Research; affiliated with Princeton Uni-
versity, USA.
1 Introduction
Intel SGX [21] allows applications to isolate secret code
and data in encrypted memory regions called enclaves.
Enclaves have many interesting applications, for instance
they can protect cloud workloads [3, 5, 22, 46] in mali-
cious or compromised environments, or guard secrets in
client devices [21].
While encryption effectively hides the contents of
memory, the sequence of memory address references is-
sued by enclave code leaks information. If the attacker
has physical access to a device, the addresses could be
obtainable by attaching hardware probes to the mem-
ory bus. In addition, a compromised operating system
or a malicious co-tenant in the cloud can obtain the ad-
dresses through cache-probing and other side-channel at-
tacks [31, 42, 44]. Such leaks effectively break the confi-
dentiality promise of enclaves [7, 9, 18, 29, 35, 47, 54].
In this paper, we explore Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
designs that prevent these information leaks under the
constraints of modern SGX processors. ORAMs com-
pletely eliminate information leakage through memory
address traces, but most ORAMs are a poor fit for en-
clave, because they have high constant overhead fac-
tors [10, 39, 49] or require large private memories [50],
which are not available in the enclave context. We ad-
dress these limitations with a new hierarchical ORAM,
the Pyramid ORAM. Our construction differs from pre-
vious hierarchical schemes as it uses simpler building
blocks that incur smaller constants in terms of complex-
ity. We instantiate each level of the hierarchy with our
variant of multilevel adaptive hashing [8], that we call
Zigzag hash table. The structure of a Zigzag hash table
allows us to avoid the kind of expensive oblivious sorting
that slowed down previous schemes [14,15,25]. We pro-
pose a new probabilistic routing network as a building
block for constructing a Zigzag hash table obliviously.
The routing network runs in n logn steps and does not
bear “hidden constants”.
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Hierarchical ORAMs, despite being sometimes re-
garded inferior to tree-based schemes due to complex re-
build phases, have specific performance characteristics
that make them the preferred choice for many applica-
tions. Inherently, most accesses to a hierarchical ORAM
are relatively cheap (i.e., when no or only few levels need
to be rebuilt), while a few accesses are expensive (i.e.,
when many levels need to be rebuilt). In contrast, in
tree-based schemes, all accesses cost the same. Since, in
hierarchical ORAMs, the schedule for rebuilds is fixed,
upcoming expensive accesses can be anticipated and the
corresponding rebuilds can be done earlier, e.g., when
the system is idle, or concurrently [16, 37]. This way,
high-latency accesses can be avoided. To reflect this, we
report online and amortized access costs. The former
measures access time without considering the rebuild and
the latter measures the online cost plus the amortized re-
build cost. Furthermore, hierarchical schemes can nat-
urally support resizable arrays and do not require ad-
ditional techniques compared to tree-based schemes (as
also noted in [34]).
We present an efficient x64-optimized implementation
of Pyramid ORAM that uses only CPU registers as pri-
vate memory. We compare our implementation with our
own implementation of Circuit ORAM [51], a state-of-
the-art tree-based ORAM scheme that also uses constant
memory, on modern Intel Skylake processors. Although
the predecessor of Circuit ORAM, Path ORAM [50], has
been successfully used in the design of custom secure
hardware and memory controllers [11–13,30,43], Circuit
ORAM has better asymptotical complexity when used
with small private memory.
Pyramid ORAM has better online asymptotical com-
plexity and outperforms Circuit ORAM in practice in
many benchmarks, even without optimized scheduling
of expensive shuffles. For typical configurations, Pyra-
mid ORAM is at least 8x faster than Circuit ORAM for
99% of accesses. Finally, although the best known hier-
archical ORAM [25] has better asymptotical complexity,
Pyramid ORAM has significantly lower constant over-
head factors, making it the preferred choice in practice.
In summary, our key contributions are:
• A novel hierarchical ORAM, Pyramid ORAM, that
asymptotically dominates tree-based schemes when
comparing online overhead of an oblivious access;
• Efficient implementations of Pyramid ORAM and
Circuit ORAM for Intel SGX;
• The first experimental results of a hierarchical
ORAM in Intel SGX. Our results show that Pyra-
mid ORAM outperforms Circuit ORAM on small
datasets and has significantly better latency for 99%
of accesses.
2 Preliminaries
Attacker Model Our model considers a trusted pro-
cessor and a trusted client program running inside an
enclave. We assume the trusted processor’s implemen-
tation is correct and the attacker is unable to physically
open the processor package to extract secrets. The pro-
cessor has a small amount of private trusted memory: the
processor’s registers; we assume the attacker is unable to
monitor accesses to the registers. The processor uses an
untrusted external memory to store data; we also refer
to the provider of this external memory as the untrusted
server as this terminology is often used in ORAM liter-
ature; in our implementation this is simply the untrusted
RAM chips that store data. We assume the attacker can
monitor all accesses of the client to the data stored in the
external memory. We assume the processor encrypts the
data before sending it to external memory (this is imple-
mented in SGX processors [32]), but the addresses where
the data is read from or written to are available in plain-
text. We assume the processor’s caches are shared with
programs under the control of the attacker, for instance
malicious co-tenants running on the same CPU [44, 47]
or a compromised operating system [54]. Hence, we
assume that an attacker can observe client memory ac-
cesses at cache-line granularity. This model covers sce-
narios where SGX processors run in an untrusted cloud
environment where they are shared amongst many ten-
ants, the cloud operating system may be compromised,
or the cloud administrator may be malicious. All side
channels that are not based on memory address traces,
including power analysis, accesses to disks and to the
network, as well as channels based on shared microarchi-
tectural elements inside the processor other than caches,
(e.g., the branch predictor [27]) are outside the scope of
this paper.
Definitions An element e is an index-value pair where
e.key and e.val refer to its key and value, respectively.
A dummy element is an element of the same size as a
real element. Elements, real or dummy, stored outside of
the client’s private memory are encrypted using seman-
tically secure encryption and are re-encrypted whenever
the client reads them to its private memory and writes
back. Hence, encrypted dummy elements are indistin-
guishable from real elements. Our construction relies on
hash functions that are instantiated using pseudo-random
functions and modeled as truly random functions. We
say that an event happens with negligible probability if
it happens with probability at most 12s , for a sufficiently
large s, e.g., 80. An event happens with very high prob-
ability (w.v.h.p.) if it happens with probability at least
1− 12s .
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Table 1: Asymptotical performance of ORAM schemes for N elements with private memory of constant size and
elements of size D =Ω(logN). All logarithms use the base of 2.
Scheme
Bandwidth cost Server Space
Online Amortized Overhead
Binary Tree ORAM [10] (Trivial bucket) D(logN)2 +(logN)4 logN
Path ORAM (SCORAM) [52] D logN+(logN)3 log logN 1
Circuit ORAM [51] D logN+(logN)3 1
Hierarchical, GO [14] D(logN)2 D(logN)3 logN
Hierarchical, GM [15] D(logN) D(logN)2 1
Hierarchical, Kushilevitz et al. [25] D(logN)2/ log logN 1
Pyramid ORAM D(logN)(log logN)2 D(logN)2(log logN)2 (log logN)2
Data-oblivious Algorithm To protect against the
above attacker, the client can run a data-oblivious coun-
terpart of its original code. Informally, a data-oblivious
algorithm appears to access memory independent of the
content of its input and output.
Let A be an algorithm that takes some input and pro-
duces an output. Let ρ be the public information about
the input and the output (e.g., the size of the input).
Given the above attacker model, we assume that all mem-
ory addresses accessed byA are observable. We say that
A is data-oblivious, i.e., secure in the outlined setting, if
there is a simulator SimA that takes only ρ and produces
a trace of memory accesses that appears to be indistin-
guishable from A ’s. That is, a trace of a data-oblivious
algorithm can be reconstructed using ρ .
Oblivious RAM ORAM is a data-oblivious
RAM [14]. We will distinguish between virtual
and real accesses. A virtual access is an access the
client intends to perform on RAM, that is, an access it
wishes to make oblivious. The real access is an access
that is made to the data structures implementing ORAM
in physical memory, i.e., those that appear on the trace
produced by an algorithm.
Performance We assume that the client uses external
memory (i.e., memory at the server) to store elements of
size D (e.g., 64 bytes) and it can fit a constant number
of such elements in its private memory. Similar to other
work on oblivious RAM [50, 51], we assume that D is
of size Ω(logN), that is, it is sufficient to store a tag of
the element. During each access the client can read a
constant number of elements into its private memory, de-
crypt and compute on them, re-encrypt, and write them
back. When analyzing the performance of executing an
algorithm that operates on external memory, we are in-
terested in counting the number of bits of the external
memory the client must access. Similar to previous work
on ORAM [50,51], we call this measurement bandwidth
cost.
For ORAM schemes, we distinguish between online
and amortized bandwidth cost. The former measures the
number of bits to obtain a requested element, while the
latter measures the amortized bandwidth for every ele-
ment. This distinction is important especially for hierar-
chical schemes that periodically stall to perform a reshuf-
fle of the external memory before they can serve the next
request. However, such reshuffles happen after a certain
number of requests are served and their cost can be amor-
tized over preceding requests that caused the reshuffle.
In Table 1 we compare the overhead of Pyramid
ORAM with other ORAM schemes that use constant
private memory. Though Pyramid ORAM uses more
space at the server than tree-based schemes, it has bet-
ter asymptotical online performance for blocks of size
O((logN/ log logN)2). Pyramid ORAM is less efficient
than hierarchical schemes by Kushilevitz et al. [25] and
Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [15]. However, as we ex-
plain in Section 9, our scheme relies on primitives that
are more efficient in practice than those used in [15, 25].
For example, we do not rely on the AKS sorting network.
3 Hierarchical ORAM (HORAM)
Our Pyramid ORAM scheme follows the same general
structure as other hierarchical ORAM (HORAM) con-
structions [14, 15, 17, 25, 53]. We outline this structure
below and describe how we instantiate it using our own
primitives, Probabilistic Routing Network (PRN) and
Zigzag Hash Table (ZHT), in the next sections.
Data Layout HORAM abstractly arranges the mem-
ory at the server into O(logN) levels, where N is the
number of elements one wishes to store remotely and ac-
cess obliviously later. Though N does not have to be
specified a priori and the structure can grow to accom-
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modate more elements, for simplicity, we assume N to
be a fixed power of 2.
The first two levels, L0 and L1, can store up to p ele-
ments each, where p ≥ 2. The third level L2, can store
up to 2p elements and the ith level stores up to 2i−1 p.1
The last level, l, can fit all N elements (i.e., l = logN/p).
Note that we only mentioned the number of real elements
that each level can fit. In many HORAM constructions,
each level also contains dummy elements that are used
for security purposes. Hence, the size of each level is of
some fixed size and is often larger than the number of
real elements the level can fit. The data within each level
is stored encrypted (implicitly done by the hardware in
the case of SGX), hence, real and dummy elements are
indistinguishable.
The first level L0 is implemented as a list. The search
over L0 is a simple scan. Each consequent level, Li≥1,
is implemented as a hash table to ensure fast search time
(e.g., a cuckoo hash table [15, 17, 25, 40] or a hash table
with buckets [14]).
Setup During the setup, the client inserts N elements
into the last level Ll and uploads the first l − 1 empty
levels and Ll to the server. As mentioned before, this is
not required and the client can populate the data structure
by writing elements obliviously one at a time.
Access During a virtual access for an element with
e.key, the client performs the following search procedure
across all levels. If level i is empty, it is skipped. If the el-
ement was not found in levels 0, . . . , i−1, then the client
searches for e.key in Li. If Li has the element, it is re-
moved from Li, cached, and the client continues access-
ing levels i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . but for dummy elements. If Li
does not have the element, the client searches for e.key
in level i+1 and so on. After all levels are accessed, the
cached e is appended to L0 (even if e was found in some
earlier location in L0 from which it was removed).
Rebuild After p accesses, L0 contains up to p ele-
ments, where some may be dummy if the same ele-
ment was accessed more than once. This triggers the
rebuild phase: L0 is emptied by inserting its real ele-
ments into L1. After the next p accesses, L0 becomes
full again. Since L1 is already full, real elements from
both L0 and L1 are inserted into L2. In general, after ev-
ery 2i p < N accesses levels 0,1, . . . , i are emptied into
Li+1. After N accesses levels 0,1, . . . , l− 1 are all full.
In this case, a new table, L′l , of the same size as Ll , is
1The construction by Kushilevitz et al. [25] uses a slightly different
layout from the one described here. In particular, it has less levels
and lower levels can hold logN× the size of the previous level instead
of 2×.
created. Elements from L0,L1, . . . ,Ll are inserted into L′l
and emptied, and Ll is replaced with L′l . The same pro-
cess repeats for the consequent accesses. Since the re-
build procedure is a deterministic function of the num-
ber of accesses performed so far, it is easy to determine
which levels need rebuilding for any given access.
The insertion of real elements from levels 0,1, . . . , i to
i+ 1 has to be done carefully in order to hide the num-
ber of real and dummy elements at each level. For exam-
ple, knowing that there was only one real element reveals
that all past accesses were for the same element. The
data-oblivious insertion (or rebuild) process depends on
the specific HORAM construction and the data structure
used to instantiate each level. Many constructions rely
on an oblivious sorting network [2, 4] for this.
Security A very high-level intuition behind the secu-
rity of an HORAM relies on the following: (1) level i
is searched for every element at most once during the
accesses between two sequential rebuilds of level i; (2)
searches for the same element before and after a rebuild
are uncorrelated; (3) the search at each level does not re-
veal which element is being searched for.
Pyramid ORAM Overview HORAM’s performance
and security rely on two critical parts: the data structure
used to instantiate levels L1, . . . ,Ll and the rebuild pro-
cedure. In this paper we propose Pyramid ORAM, an
HORAM instantiated with a novel data structure and a
rebuild phase tailored to it. In Section 5 we devise a new
hash table, a Zigzag Hash Table, and use it to instanti-
ate each level of an HORAM. To avoid using an expen-
sive oblivious sorting network when rebuilding a Zigzag
Hash Table, in Section 5.2 we design a setup phase using
a Probabilistic Routing Network (Section 4). The com-
bination of the two primitives and their small constants
result in an HORAM that is more efficient in practice
than previous HORAM schemes.
4 Probabilistic Routing Network (PRN)
In this section, we describe a Probabilistic Routing Net-
work that we use in the rebuild phase of our HORAM
instantiation. However, the network as described here,
with its data-oblivious guarantees and efficiency, may be
of an independent interest.
A PRN takes a table of n buckets with c slots in
each bucket. The bucket size is sufficiently small com-
pared to n. For example, in Pyramid ORAM c is set to
O(log logn). The input table has at most n real elements
labeled with indices 0,1, . . . ,n−1 denoting their destina-
tion buckets. The labels do not have to be stored along-
side the elements and can be determined using a hash
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Figure 1: Routing network for n = 8 elements where
each element is indicated in the input table by its desti-
nation position (e.g., the destination of the element in the
first bucket is 5 and destinations of the two elements in
the second bucket are 6 and 7). The elements that could
not be routed in the second stage (i.e., tagged false by the
network) are greyed out.
function, for example. There can be more than one el-
ement in the input bucket and, since a hash function is
not a permutation function, two or more elements may
be assigned to the same destination bucket.
A PRN’s goal is to route a large subset of elements to
the correct output buckets. In the output, elements in that
subset are associated with the tag true, others with false.
Given the destination labels, the network’s output can be
used for efficient element lookups. Such a lookup is suc-
cessful, if an element was routed to its correct destination
(i.e., has tag true).
For the security purposes of HORAM, we wish to de-
sign a network that is data-oblivious in the following
sense. The adversary that observes the routing as well
as element accesses to the output learns nothing about
the placement of the elements in the output as long as it
does not learn whether accesses are successful or not.
Algorithm We now describe a routing network with
the above properties. The routing network consists of
logn stages where the input at each stage, except the first
stage, is the output of the previous stage. The output of
the last stage is the output of the network. Besides the
destination bucket indices, every element also carries a
Boolean tag that is set to true for every real element in
the original input. (However, depending on the use case,
input elements may be tagged false, for example, if they
are dummy elements.) Once the tag is set to false, it does
not change throughout the network. Crucially, only ele-
ments that are in their correct destination buckets in the
output are tagged true.
At each stage i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ logn, we perform a re-
partition operation between each pair of buckets with in-
dices that differ only by the bit in position i (starting from
the lowest bit). (Note that here indices correspond to in-
dices of the input buckets, not the indices of the desti-
nations of the elements inside.) For example, for n = 8,
when i= 1 we re-partition the following pairs of buckets:
(000,001),(010,011),(100,101) and (110,111) and
when i = 3, buckets: (000,100),(001,101),(010,110)
and (011,111). The re-partition operation itself moves
items between the two buckets (number them one and
two) and works as follows: For elements with tag true,
we consider the ith bit of their bucket index. If this bit is
set to 0, the element goes to the first bucket, and to the
second bucket, otherwise. As there may be more than c
elements assigned the same bit at position i, the network
chooses c of them at random, and retags the extra/spilled
elements with false. All elements tagged false, includ-
ing those that arrived with the false tag from the previ-
ous stage, are then allowed to go in either bucket (note
that there is always space for all elements). The effect of
the network is that at stage i, every element still tagged
true will have the first i bits match that of the destina-
tion bucket. Therefore, after logn stages elements will
either be tagged false, or be in the correct bucket. (An
illustration of the routing network for n = 8 is given in
Figure 1.)
Bucket Partitioning We now describe how to perform
the re-partition of two buckets. If the client memory
is 2c then the re-partition is trivial. Otherwise, we use
Batcher’s sorting network [4] as follows. The two buck-
ets are treated as one contiguous range of length 2c that
needs to be sorted ordering the elements as follows: (1)
elements with bit 0 at the ith position, (2) empty elements
and elements tagged false, and (3) elements with bit 1 at
the ith position. Sorting will therefore cause a partition,
with empty and false-tagged elements in the middle, and
other elements in their correct buckets.
Analysis In this section we summarize the perfor-
mance and security properties of the network.
Theorem 1. The probabilistic routing network operates
in (n/2) logn×Sort(2c) steps, where Sort(c) is time to
sort c elements obliviously.
The theorem follows trivially: the network has logn
stages where each stage consists of repartitioning of n/2
pairs of buckets.
Corollary 1. The probabilistic routing network oper-
ates in O(c(logc)2n logn) steps using constant private
memory and Batcher’s sorting network for repartition-
ing bucket pairs.
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The PRN is more efficient than Batcher’s sorting net-
work, that runs in O(n(logn)2) steps, at the expense of
not being able to route all the elements. Though the net-
work cannot produce all n! permutations, it gives us im-
portant security properties. As long as the adversary does
not learn which output elements are tagged true and false
it does not learn the position of the elements in the out-
put. Hence, when using the network in the ORAM set-
ting we will need to ensure that the adversary does not
learn whether an element reached its destination or not.
We summarize this property below.
Theorem 2. The probabilistic routing network and
lookup accesses to its output are data-oblivious as long
as the adversary does not learn whether lookups were
successful or not.
Proof. The accesses made by the routing network to the
input are independent of the input as they are determin-
istic and the re-partition operation is either done in pri-
vate memory or using a data-oblivious sorting primitive.
Hence, we can build the simulator Simroute that, given
a table of dummy elements, performs accesses accord-
ing to the network. The adversary cannot distinguish
Simroute from the real routing even if it knows the lo-
cation of the elements in the input.
During the search, the adversary is allowed to request
lookups for the elements from the original input and ob-
serve the accessed buckets. For data-obliviousness, the
lookup simulator is notified about the lookup but not the
element being searched. The simulator then accesses a
random bucket of the output generated by Simroute.
The accesses of the simulator and the real algorithm
diverge only in the lookup procedure. The accesses
generated by the simulator are from a random function,
while real lookups access elements according to a hash
function used to route the elements. Since the adver-
sary is not notified whether a lookup was successful or
not, it cannot distinguish whether simulator’s function
could have been used to successfully allocate the same
elements as the real routing network. Hence, the distri-
bution of lookup accesses by the simulator is indistin-
guishable from the real routing network.
We defer the analysis of the number of elements that
are routed to their output bucket to the next section as
it depends on how elements are distributed across input
buckets. For example, we assume random allocation of
the elements in the input in Pyramid ORAM.
5 Zigzag Hash Table (ZHT)
In this section we describe a data structure, called Zigzag
Hash Table (ZHT), that we use to instantiate the levels of
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Figure 2: A Zigzag hash table for n = 8 elements with
k = 3 tables where each table has 8 buckets of size c= 2.
Elements 0–7 were inserted in order, with hash functions
defined as: h1(1) = 4, h1(2) = h1(3) = h1(5) = h1(6) =
h1(7) = 1, h1(4) = h1(0) = 5, h2(5) = h2(6) = h2(7) = 5
and h3(7) = 3. Zigzag path of element 7 is defined as
p7 = {1,5,3}.
our hierarchical ORAM. A ZHT is a variation of mul-
tilevel adaptive hashing [8] but instantiated with tables
of fixed size and buckets of size c (see Section 9 for a
detailed comparison). We begin with the non-oblivious
version of a ZHT and then explain how to perform search
and rebuild obliviously.
A ZHT is a probabilistic hash table that can store up
to n key-value elements with very high probability. We
refer to n as the capacity of a ZHT, that is, the largest
number of elements it can store. ZHT consists of k ta-
bles, H1,H2, . . . ,Hk. Each table contains n buckets, with
each bucket containing at most c elements. Each table
is associated with a distinct hash function hi that maps
element keys to buckets. The hash functions are fixed
during the setup, before the elements arrive.
An element e is associated with an (abstract) zigzag
path defined by the series of bucket locations in each ta-
ble: h1(e.key), h2(e.key), . . . ,hk(e.key). Elements are
inserted into the table by accessing the buckets along the
path, placing the element in the first empty slot. If the
path is full, the insertion procedure has failed. When
Table 2: Notation.
N Number of elements in ORAM
n Capacity of a Zigzag Hash Table (ZHT)
k Number of tables in a ZHT
c Bucket size of tables H1, . . . ,Hk in a ZHT
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referring to the insertion of several elements, we use
throw(A,H1, H2, . . . ,Hk) that takes elements in the ar-
ray A and inserts them according to their zigzag paths.
Once inserted, elements are found by scanning the path
and comparing indices of elements in the buckets until
the element is found. (See Figure 2 for an illustration of
a ZHT.)
Definition 5.1 (Valid zigzag paths). Let p1,p2, . . . ,pn be
n zigzag paths. If every element e j can be inserted into a
ZHT according to locations in the path p j, then the paths
are valid.
If n elements are successfully inserted in a ZHT, we
say that the zigzag paths associated with the elements
are valid. We will use ZHTn,k,c to denote a ZHT with
parameters k and c sufficient to avoid overflow with high
probability when inserting n elements. We summarize
the parameters and the performance of a ZHT below.
Theorem 3 (ZHT Performance). Insertion and search of
an element in a ZHTn,k,c takes O(kc) accesses. Insertion
of n elements fails with negligible probability when k =
O(log logn) and c = O(log logn).
Proof. (Sketch.) The analysis follows Theorem 5.2
from [1], adopted for our scenario. We note that the anal-
ysis in [1] is for re-throwing elements into the same table
and not into an empty table, as is the case in our data
structure.
We refer to an element of a table as overflowed if the
bucket it was allocated to already had c elements in it.
For each table Hi, we are interested in measuring ini,
the number of incoming elements, and outi, the num-
ber of outgoing elements. The former comprises the ele-
ments that did not fit in tables 1,2, . . . , i−1. The number
of outgoing elements comprises elements that did not fit
into table i when throwing ini. Except for the first phase,
the number of incoming elements into Hi is determined
by the number of outgoing elements of Hi−1. Hence, to
determine k we need to bound the number of outgoing
elements at each level.
We first show that one round of throw is required to
bound the number of overflowed elements to be at most
n/(2e) (Lemma 9). We then show that as long as the
number of elements arriving at the table is less than
n/(2e) only O(log logn) tables are required to fit all n
elements (Lemma 11).
We note that buckets that hold at most one element
(i.e., c = 1) are sufficient to bound the number of ta-
bles, k, to be loglogn+O(1) [1, 8]. However, as will
be explained in the following sections, in order to in-
sert elements into a ZHT obliviously we require c to be
O(log logn).
As described so far, the insertion procedure of a
ZHT does not provide security properties one desires for
ORAM (e.g., observing insertion of n elements and a
search for element e reveals when e was inserted). In
the next section, we make small alternations to the inser-
tion and search procedures of a ZHT and summarize the
security properties a ZHT already has. In particular, we
will show that one can obliviously search for elements in
a ZHT, as long as it was constructed privately. Then, in
Section 5.2 we show how to insert n elements into a ZHT
obliviously using small private memory.
5.1 Data-oblivious properties of ZHT
We make the following minor changes to a ZHT and
its insertion and search procedures. We fill all empty
slots of a ZHT with dummy elements. Recall that in
the ORAM setting the data structure is encrypted and
dummy elements are indistinguishable from real. Then,
when inserting an element, instead of stopping once the
first empty slot is found, we access the remaining buckets
on the path, pretending to write to all of them. Similarly,
during the search, we do not stop when the element is
found and access all buckets on its zigzag path. Hence,
anyone observing accesses of an insert (or search) ob-
serve the zigzag path but do not know where on the path
the element was inserted (or found). We define dummy
counterparts of insertion and search procedures that sim-
ply access a random bucket in each table of a ZHT, per-
forming fake writes and reads.
Given the above changes, the search for n elements is
data-oblivious as long as every element is searched for
only once and assuming that an adversary does not ob-
serve how the table was built.
Lemma 1 (ZHT Data-Oblivious Search). Searching
for n distinct elements in a ZHTn,k,c is data-oblivious.
Proof. We can build a simulator that given n,k and c pro-
duces a sequence of accesses to its tables indistinguish-
able from locations accessed by a ZHT algorithm.
Consider an algorithm (with large private memory)
that takes n elements and inserts them one by one into
an empty ZHT. If it cannot insert all n elements, it fails.
Otherwise, during a search request for an element key,
e.key, it accesses the locations that correspond to the
zigzag path defined by e.key and the hash functions of
the ZHT.
The simulator, Simsearch, sets up k tables with n buck-
ets of size c each. For every search, the simulator per-
forms a dummy search. We say that a simulator fails if
after simulating searches for n elements, it has produced
accesses to ZHT tables that do not form n valid zigzag
paths.
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In each case the adversary chooses n original elements.
It then requests a search for one of the n elements that
it has not requested before. A ZHT algorithm is given
the key of the element, while the simulator is invoked
to perform a dummy search. In both cases, the adver-
sary is given the locations accessed during the search. If
neither the simulator nor the ZHT algorithm fail, the ac-
cessed locations are indistinguishable as long as ZHT’s
hash functions are indistinguishable from truly random
functions. The failure cases of the algorithms allow the
adversary to distinguish the two as failures happen at dif-
ferent stages of the indistinguishability game. However,
both failures happen with negligible probability due to
the success rate of a ZHTn,k,c.
Lemma 2. Searching for n distinct elements in a
ZHTn,k,c is data-oblivious even if the adversary knows
the order of insertions.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Lemma 1, ex-
cept now the adversary controls the order in which the
ZHT algorithm inserts the elements. As before, we use
Simsearch that is not given the actual elements and the ad-
versary does not observe accesses of the insertion phase.
Let pi be the zigzag path of element ei. Notice that k
hash functions that determine zigzag paths are chosen be-
fore the elements are inserted into an empty ZHT. Hence,
the order in which ei is inserted in the ZHT influences
where on the path ei will appear (e.g., if ei is inserted
first, then it will be placed into H1, on the other hand, if
it is inserted last it may not find a spot in H1 and could
even appear in Hk) but not the path it is on. Since the
adversary does not learn where on the path an element
was found, the rest of the proof is similar to the proof of
Lemma 1
We capture another property of a ZHT that will be use-
ful when used inside of an ORAM: locations accessed
during the insertion appear to be independent of the ele-
ments being thrown. Moreover, as we show in the next
lemma, the adversary cannot distinguish whether thrown
elements were real or dummy.
Lemma 3. The algorithm throw(A,H1,H2, . . . ,Hk) is
data-oblivious where H1,H2, . . . ,Hk are hash tables of
ZHTn,k,c and the size of A is at most n.
Proof. The adversary chooses up to n distinct elements
and requests throw. The algorithm fails if it cannot in-
sert all elements in k tables. The simulator Simthrow is
given A that contains only dummies. It accesses a ran-
dom bucket in each of the k tables for every element in A.
The adversary can distinguish the two algorithms only
when throw fails or when Simthrow generates invalid
zigzag paths for A. According to Theorem 3, this hap-
pens with negligible probability.
Lemma 4. Consider throw(A,H1,H2, . . . ,Hk) where A
contains nreal ≤ n real elements and ndummy dummy el-
ements, where a real element is inserted as usual while
on a dummy element each table is accessed at a random
index. The algorithm throw remains data-oblivious.
Proof. We define an adversary that chooses a permuta-
tion of nreal real elements and ndummy dummy elements,
that is, it knows the locations of the real elements. We
build a simulator that is given an empty ZHTn,k,c table.
The simulator accesses a random bucket in each table of
the ZHT on every element in A.
The adversary can distinguish between the simulator
and the throw algorithm if (1) the algorithm fails, which
happens when the algorithm cannot insert all real ele-
ments successfully or (2) the simulator generates invalid
zigzag paths when performing a fake insertion for the
input locations that correspond to real elements (recall
that the simulator does not know the locations of real ele-
ments). Both events correspond to the failure of the ZHT
construction, which happens with negligible probability
(Theorem 3).
5.2 Data-oblivious ZHT Setup
A Zigzag hash table allows one to search elements obliv-
iously if insertion of these elements was done privately.
Since the private memory of the client is much smaller
than n in our scenario, we develop an algorithm that
can build a ZHT relying on small memory and access-
ing the server memory in an oblivious manner. That is,
the server does not learn the placement of the elements
in the final ZHT.
The algorithm starts by placing elements in the tables
H1,H2, . . . ,Hk using throw procedure from Section 5 ac-
cording to random hash functions. The algorithm then
proceeds in k phases. In the first phase, H1 is given as
an input to the probabilistic routing network where the
destination bucket of every element in H1 is determined
by h1. The result is a hash table with some fraction of
the elements in the right buckets and some overflown el-
ements (tagged as false). The algorithm then pretends to
throw all elements of H1 into tables H2,H3, . . . ,Hk using
yet another set of random functions. However, only over-
flown elements, that is elements that were not routed to
their correct bucket in H1, are actually inserted into ta-
bles H2,H3, . . . ,Hk. For empty entries and elements that
are labeled true in H1, the algorithm accesses random
locations in H2,H3, . . . ,Hk and only pretends to write to
them. In the end of this step every element that did not
fit into H1 during the routing network appears in one of
H2,H3, . . . ,Hk at a random location. In the second phase,
H2 goes through the network where destination buckets
are determined using h2, and so on. In general, every Hi
goes through the network using hi, then all elements of Hi
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are thrown into tables Hi+1,Hi+2, . . . ,Hk, where only el-
ements that were not routed correctly are inserted. (See
Figure 12 in Appendix for an illustration of the oblivious
setup of a ZHT.)
The algorithm fails if an element cannot find a spot in
any of the k tables. This happens either during one of the
throws of the elements or during the final phase where
not all elements of Hk can be routed according to hk.
Performance We now analyze the parameters and the
performance of the ZHT setup and then describe the se-
curity properties.
Theorem 4. Insertion of n elements into a ZHTn,k,c as
described in Section 5.2 succeeds with very high proba-
bility if k = O(log logn) and c = O(log logn).
Proof. (Sketch.) The analysis is similar to the analy-
sis in Theorem 3 with the difference that the number
of elements going into level Hi+1 is higher due to addi-
tional overflows that happen during routing. In Lemma 8,
we show that if n is the number of input elements in
hash table Hi, then the number of overflows from rout-
ing is bounded by logn× the number of overflows of a
throw into a single hash table. Then, following simi-
lar proof arguments as Theorem 3, we use Lemmas 10
and 12 to bound the spill at each phase and show that
if k = O(log logn), then the insertion of n elements suc-
ceeds w.v.h.p.
Theorem 5 (Oblivious ZHT Setup Performance). If
oblivious ZHT insertion of n elements does not fail, it
takes O(nkc((logc)2 logn+ kc)) steps.
Proof. The initial throw takes nkc and n(k−1)c2, n(k−
2)c2, . . ., nc2 steps for the subsequent throws. The com-
plexity of applying a routing network to a single table
is O(c(logc)2n logn). Since the algorithm performs k
routing networks, the total cost is O(kc(logc)2n logn+
n(kc)2) = O(nkc((logc)2 logn+ kc)).
When used in Pyramid ORAM, a ZHT is constructed
from all elements in previous levels of the hierarchy. The
levels include real elements as well as many dummy
elements. Hence, the initial throw of the setup algo-
rithm may contain additional dummy elements. Throw-
ing dummy elements does not change the failure proba-
bility of the setup. However, the initial throw becomes
more expensive than that in Theorem 5 as summarized
below.
Corollary 2 (Oblivious ZHT Setup Performance).
Oblivious ZHT insertion of n real elements and (α−1)n
dummy elements takes O(nkc((logc)2 logn+αkc)), for
α ≥ 1.
Security We show that an adversary that observes the
ZHT setup does not learn the final placement of the ele-
ments across the tables.
Theorem 6. The insertion procedure of ZHTn,k,c de-
scribed in Section 5.2 is data-oblivious.
Proof. An adversary is allowed to interact with the al-
gorithm and a simulator as follows: choose up to n ele-
ments and request the oblivious setup of ZHTn,k,c, then
request a search of at most n elements (real or dummy)
on ZHTn,k,c. It then repeats the experiment either for the
same set of n elements or a different one.
As before, the real algorithm fails if it cannot build
ZHTn,k,c. The simulator Simbuild is given an array A of
n dummy elements and parameters k and c. It sets up
ZHTn,k,c and runs Simthrow(A,H1, H2, . . . ,Hk). It then
calls Simroute from Theorem 2 on H1. After that the
throw of the spilled elements is imitated via Simthrow(H1,
H2, H3, . . . ,Hk) from Lemma 4. It then again calls
Simroute but on its own version of H2. Once finished, on
every search request from the adversary, Simsearch, that is
not aware of the actions of Simthrow, is called.
If the algorithm does not fail during the insertion phase
and the simulator produces valid zigzag paths during
Simthrow and Simsearch, then the adversary obtains only
traces that are produced either by a hash function (i.e., a
pseudo-random function) or by a random function. We
showed that ZHTthrow and Simthrow fail with negligible
probability. The real search and Simsearch are also indis-
tinguishable even if the adversary controls the order of
the inserted elements as long as the adversary does not
learn element’s position in its zigzag path. Since there
is Simroute which simulates route, the adversary does not
learn element positions after routing. Since every ele-
ment participates in the throw, we showed in Lemma 4
that the adversary does not learn which elements are
dummy. Hence, the adversary does not learn positions
of the elements across the tables and search can be sim-
ulated successfully.
6 Pyramid ORAM
We are now ready to present Pyramid ORAM by instanti-
ating the hierarchical construction in Section 3 with data-
oblivious Zigzag hash tables.
Data Layout. Level L0 is a list as before while every
level Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, is a Zigzag hash table with capacity
2i−1 p and ki,ci chosen appropriately for Theorem 3 to
hold. We denote the bucket size and table number used
for the last level with c and k. That is, Ll is a ZHTN,k,c.
Setup. The setup is as described in Section 3, i.e., el-
ements can be placed either in Ll or inserted obliviously
one by one causing the initially empty ORAM to grow.
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Access. The access to each level i is an oblivious ZHT
search, if the element was not found in previous levels,
or a dummy ZHT access.
Rebuild. The rebuild phase involves calling the data-
oblivious ZHT setup as described in Section 5.2. In par-
ticular, at level i, a new ZHT for 2i−1 p elements is set
up. Then, all elements from previous levels, including
dummy, participate in the initial throw.
We first determine the amortized rebuild cost of level i
for an HORAM scheme and then analyze the overall per-
formance of Pyramid ORAM.
Lemma 5. If the rebuild of level i≥ 1 takes O(2i−1 pCi)
steps, for Ci > 0, then the amortized cost of the rebuild
operation for every access to ORAM is ∑logN/pi=1 O(Ci).
Proof. Since the rebuild of level i happens every 2i−1 p
accesses, the amortized cost of rebuilding level i is O(Ci).
Each access eventually causes a rebuild of every level,
that is, logN/p rebuilds of different costs. Hence, total
amortized cost is:
logN/p
∑
i=1
O(Ci).
Theorem 7 (Performance). Pyramid ORAM incurs
O(kc logN) online and O(kc(logN)2) amortized band-
width overheads, O(kc) space overhead, and succeeds
with very high probability.
Proof. The complexity of a lookup in a ZHT is kc. The
complexity of a lookup in the first level is p. There are
logN/p levels. So the cost of a lookup is p+kc logN/p.
Since p is usually set to logN, the access time between
table rebuilds, that is the online bandwidth overhead, is
O(kc logN).
The rebuild of level i takes
O(2i−1 pkc((logc)2 log(2i−1 p) + kc)) steps since
α = kc (see Corollary 2) and k ≥ ki and c ≥ ci, for
every i. Setting Ci to kc((logc)2 log(2i−1 p)+ kc) and p
to be at least 2 in Lemma 5, we obtain:
logN/p
∑
i=1
kc((logc)2 log(2i−1 p)+ kc)
= kc
logN/p
∑
i=1
(
(logc)2 log(2i−1 p)+ kc
)
= kc
(
(logc)2
logN/p
∑
i=1
(i−1+ log p)+ kc logN/p
)
= kc
(
(logc)2(logN)2+ kc logN
)
= O(kc(logN)2)
Pyramid ORAM fails when the rebuild of some level i
fails, that is, the number of tables allocated for level i
was not sufficient to accommodate all real elements from
the levels above. Since, the number of real elements in
tables at levels 0,1, . . . , i− 1 is at most the capacity of
the ZHT at level i, ZHT fails with negligible probability
as per analysis in Theorem 4. Hence, the overall failure
probability of Pyramid ORAM can be bounded using a
union bound.
Theorem 8 (Security). Pyramid ORAM is data-
oblivious with very high probability.
Proof. The adversary chooses N elements of its choice
and requests oblivious insertion in Ll . It then makes
a polynomial number of requests to elements in the
ORAM. We use Simbuild from Theorem 6 and Simsearch
from Lemma 1 for every level except L0, which simulates
naive scanning.
Between two rebuilds the search operation at each
level is performed to distinct elements and every table
uses a new set of hash functions after its rebuild. The
hash functions are also different across the levels. Hence,
Simsearch can simulate the search at every level indepen-
dently.
Simbuild for level i takes as input the number of dummy
elements proportional to the total number of elements,
real and dummy, in L0,L1, . . . ,Li−1. We showed that we
can construct Simbuild even if the adversary knows the
original elements inserted in the table. Hence, Simbuild
succeeds when the adversary controls the elements in-
serted in the ORAM as well as the access sequence.
7 Implementation
We implemented Pyramid ORAM and Circuit
ORAM [51] in C++ with oblivious primitives writ-
ten in x64 assembly. As ORAM block size, we use the
x64 architecture’s cache-line width of 64 bytes. Given
that our assumed attacker is able to observe cache-line
granular memory accesses, this block size facilitates the
implementation of data-oblivious primitives. A block
comprises 56 bytes of data, the corresponding 4-byte
index, and a 4-byte tag, which indicates the element’s
state (see Section 4).
To be data-oblivious, our implementations are care-
fully crafted to be free of attacker-observable secret-
dependent data or code accesses. We avoid secret-
dependent branches on the assembly level either by em-
ploying conditional instructions or by ensuring that all
branch’s possible targets lie within the same 64-byte
cache line. For data, we use registers as private mem-
ory and align data in memory with respect to cache-line
boundaries. Similar to previous work [36, 41], we create
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a library of simple data-oblivious primitives using condi-
tional move instructions and CPU registers. These allow
us, for example, to obliviously compare and swap values.
Hash functions used in Pyramid ORAM are instantiated
with our SIMD implementation of the Speck cipher.2
7.1 Pyramid ORAM
For bucket sizes of c > 4, our implementation of Pyra-
mid ORAM uses a Batcher’s sorting network for the re-
partitioning of two buckets within our probabilistic rout-
ing network described in Section 4.
For c = 4, we employ a custom re-partition algorithm
that is optimized for the x64 platform and leverages
SIMD operations on 256-bit AVX2 registers. The im-
plementation is outlined in the following. For most op-
erations, we use AVX2 registers as vectors of four 32-bit
components. To re-partition two buckets A and B, we
maintain the tag vectors tA and tB and position vectors
pA and pB. Initially, we load the four tags of bucket A
into tA and those of bucket B into tB. A tag indicates an
element’s state. Empty elements and elements that were
spilled in the previous stages of the network are assigned
-1; elements that have not been spilled and need to be
routed to either bucket A or B are assigned 0 and 1, re-
spectively.
pA and pB map element positions in the input buckets
to element positions in the output buckets. We refer to the
elements in the input buckets by indices. The elements
in input bucket A are assigned the indices 1 . . .4, those in
input bucket B the indices 5 . . .8. Correspondingly, we
initially set pA = (1,2,3,4) and pB = (5,6,7,8).
We then sort the tags by performing four oblivious
SIMD compare-and-swap operations between tA and tB.
Each such operation comprises four 1-to-1 comparisons.
(Hence, a total of 16 1-to-1 compare-swap-operations are
performed.) Every time elements are swapped between
tA and tB, we also swap the corresponding elements in
pA and pB. In the end, tA and tB are sorted and pA and
pB contain the corresponding mapping of input to output
positions. Finally, we load the two input buckets entirely
into the 16 available AVX2 registers (which provide pre-
cisely the required amount of private memory) and obliv-
iously write their elements to the output buckets accord-
ing to pA and pB.
Instantiation In our implementation, the ORAM’s
first level holds 1024 cache-lines, because for smaller ar-
ray sizes scanning performs better. All other levels use
buckets of size c = 4 and the number of tables is set to
dlog loge of the capacity of the level. We empirically ver-
ified parameters k = c = 4 for tables of size 211 and 215
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speck_(cipher)
when re-throwing elements 223 and 220 times, respec-
tively. In both cases, we have not observed spills into
the third table (in any of the levels), hence, the last two
tables of every level were always empty.
7.2 Circuit ORAM
For comparison, we implemented a recursive version of
Circuit ORAM [51] with a deterministic eviction strat-
egy. Circuit ORAM proposes a novel protocol to imple-
ment the eviction of tree-based ORAMs using a constant
amount of private memory. This makes Circuit ORAM
the state-of-the-art tree-based ORAM protocol with op-
timal circuit complexity for O(1) client memory. Similar
to other tree-based schemes Circuit ORAM stores ele-
ments in a binary tree and maintains a mapping between
element indices and their position in the tree in a recur-
sive position map. We refer the reader to [51] for the
details of Circuit ORAM.
We implemented Circuit ORAM from scratch using
our library of primitives, as existing implementations3
were built for simulation purposes and only concern with
high-level obliviousness. This makes these implementa-
tions not fully oblivious and vulnerable to low-level side-
channel attacks based on control flow. Similar to Pyra-
mid ORAM, we use a cache line as a block for Circuit
ORAM. This favors Circuit ORAM since up to 14 in-
dices can be packed in each block, requiring only log14 N
levels of recursion to store the position map. Hence, the
bandwidth cost of our implementation of Circuit ORAM
is only 64 bytes × O(log14 N logN). Similar to Pyramid
ORAM, scanning is faster than accessing binary trees for
small datasets. To this end, we stop the recursion when
the position map is reduced to 512 indices or less and
store these elements in an array that is scanned on every
access. We chose 512 since it gave the best performance.
Instantiation We use a bucket size of 3 with two stash
parameters: 12 and 20, that is every level of recursion
uses the same stash size since these parameters are inde-
pendent of the size of a tree, and a bucket size of 4 and
stash size 12. We note that buckets of size 2 were not
sufficient in our experiments to avoid overflows. In the
figures we denote the three settings with Circuit-3-12,
Circuit-3-20 and Circuit-4-12.
8 Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the performance of Pyramid
ORAM in comparison to Circuit ORAM and naive scan-
ning when accessing arrays of different sizes, when used
3https://github.com/wangxiao1254/oram_simulator
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Figure 3: Average overhead of obliviously reading ele-
ments from an array of 56-byte elements. Array sizes
vary from 2048 to 16384 elements (114KB–917KB).
in two machine learning applications, and when run in-
side Intel SGX enclaves. The key insight is that, for
the given datasets, Pyramid ORAM considerably outper-
forms Circuit ORAM (orders of magnitude) in terms of
online access times and is still several x faster for 99.9%
of accesses when rebuilds are included in the timings.
All experiments were performed on SGX-enabled In-
tel Core i7-6700 CPUs running Windows Server 2016.
All code was compiled with the Microsoft C/C++ com-
piler v19.00 with /O2. In cases where we ran code inside
SGX enclaves, it was linked against a custom SGX soft-
ware stack. We report all measurements in CPU cycles.
ORAM vs. Scanning Figure 3 shows the break-even
point of Pyramid and Circuit ORAM compared to the
basic approach—called Naive in the following—of scan-
ning through all elements of an array for each access.
Our implementation of Naive is optimized using AVX2
SIMD operations and is the same as the one we use
to scan the first level in our Pyramid implementation.
Hence, for up to 1024 elements (the size of Pyramid’s
first level), Naive and Pyramid perform identically. We
also set Circuit ORAM to use scanning for small arrays.
Pyramid and Circuit start improving over Naive at 4096
(229 KB) and 8192 elements (459 KB), respectively.
Pyramid vs. Circuit Figures 6 and 7 depict the perfor-
mance of Pyramid and Circuit when sequentially access-
ing arrays of 1-byte and 56-byte elements. Pyramid dom-
inates Circuit for datasets of size up to 14 MB. Though
Circuit ORAM should perform worse for smaller ele-
ments than larger ones, it is not evident in the 1-byte
and 56-byte experiments since our implementation uses
(machine-optimized) large block sizes favoring Circuit
ORAM.
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Figure 4: Average CPU cycle overhead of obliviously
reading 1-byte elements from arrays of size 217 to 220
(4KB–1MB) in an SGX enclave; the measurements are
normalized to the performance of Pyramid ORAM.
Intel SGX We run several benchmarks inside of an
SGX enclave. Due to memory restrictions of around
100 MB in the first generation of Intel SGX, we evaluate
the algorithms on small datasets. Since both Circuit and
Pyramid have space overhead, the actual data that can be
loaded in an ORAM is at most 12 MB. Compared to the
results in the previous section, SGX does not add any no-
ticeable overhead. Figures 4 and 5 show the results for
arrays with 1-byte and 56-byte elements.
Variation of access overhead As noted earlier, the
overhead of accessing a hierarchical ORAM depends on
the number of previous accesses. For example, an ac-
cess that causes a rebuild of the last level is much slower
than the subsequent access (for which no rebuild hap-
pens). Hence, Pyramid ORAM exhibits different online
and amortized cost as noted in Table 1. To investigate this
effect, we accessed Pyramid and Circuit 3N times and
measured the overhead of every request for N = 220 and
N = 225. For both schemes the measured time includes
the time to access the element and to prepare the data
structure for the next request, that is, it includes rebuild
and eviction for Pyramid ORAM and Circuit ORAM,
respectively. Figures 8 and 9 show the corresponding
overhead split across 99.9% of the fastest among 3N ac-
cesses. As can be seen, the fraction of expensive accesses
in Pyramid is very small since large rebuilds are infre-
quent. For N = 220, almost 40% of all Pyramid accesses
are answered on average in 16.6K CPU cycles, almost
10× faster than Circuit. Except for the few accesses that
cause a rebuild, Pyramid answers 99.9% of all accesses
on average in 26.8K CPU cycles, compared to 178.7K
cycles for Circuit. A similar trend can be observed for the
larger array in Figure 9: for 35% of all accesses, Pyramid
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Figure 5: Average CPU cycle overhead (normalized
to Pyramid ORAM) of obliviously reading 56-byte el-
ements from arrays of size 4096 to 32768 (229KB–
1.8MB) from an Intel SGX enclave.
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Figure 6: Average CPU cycle overhead (normalized to
Pyramid ORAM) of obliviously reading 1-byte elements
from arrays of size 217 to 224 (131KB–16MB).
is at least 10× faster than Circuit and still 8× faster for
99% of all accesses, while, on average, Circuit performs
better. We stress that for many applications the online
cost is the significant characteristic, as expensive rebuilds
can be anticipated and performed during idle times or, to
some extent, can be performed concurrently.
Sparse Vectors Dot product between a vector and a
sparse vector is a common operation in machine-learning
algorithms. For example, in linear SVM [23], a model
contains a weight for every feature while a sample record
may contain only some of the features. Since relatively
few features may be present in a sample record, records
are stored as (feature index, value) pairs. The dot prod-
uct is computed by performing random accesses into the
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Figure 7: Average CPU cycle overhead (normalized
to Pyramid ORAM) of obliviously reading 56-byte el-
ements from arrays of size 211 to 224 (114KB–939MB)
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of access times in CPU
cycles when requesting elements from an array of 220
56-byte elements (58 MB) where 99.9% of fastest ac-
cesses are plotted. For example, Pyramid ORAM (Cir-
cuit ORAM) answers 50% and 99% of all requests un-
der 23K (159K) and 82K (340K) CPU cycles.
model based on the feature indices, in turn, revealing the
identities of the features present in the record.
We use ORAM to store and access the model vector of
4-byte floating feature values in order to protect record
content during classification. To measure the overhead,
we choose three datasets with sparse sample records
from LIBSVM Tools4: news20.binary (1,355,191 fea-
tures and 19,996 records), rcv1-train (47,236 fea-
tures and 20,242 records) and rcv1-test (47,236 fea-
tures and 677,399 records). These datasets are common
datasets for text classification where a feature is a binary
term signifying the presence of a particular trigram. As a
4https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvmtools/
datasets/ (accessed 15/05/2017).
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of access times in CPU
cycles when requesting elements from an array of 225
56-byte elements (1.87GB) where 99.9% of fastest ac-
cesses are plotted. For example, Pyramid ORAM (Cir-
cuit ORAM) answers 50% and 99% of all requests un-
der 33.8K (260K) and 90K (452K) CPU cycles.
result the datasets are sparse (e.g., if the first dataset were
to be stored densely, only 0.0336% of its values would be
non-zero). In Figure 10 we compare the overhead of the
ORAM schemes over insecure baseline when computing
dot product on each dataset. The insecure baseline mea-
sures sparse vector multiplication without side-channel
protection. As expected, Pyramid performs better than
Circuit, as model sizes are 5.4MB for news20.binary
and 188KB for rcv1. Comparing to the baseline, the av-
erage ORAM overhead is four and three orders of mag-
nitude, respectively.
Decision Trees Tree traversal is also a common task
in machine learning where a model is a set of decision
trees (a forest) and a classification on a sample record
is done by traversing the trees according to record’s fea-
tures. Hence, accesses to the tree can reveal information
about sample records. One can use an ORAM to pro-
tect such data-dependent accesses either by placing the
whole tree in an ORAM or by placing each layer of the
tree in a separate ORAM. The latter approach suits bal-
anced trees, however, for unbalanced trees it reveals the
height of the tree and the number of nodes at each layer.
Our experiments use a pre-trained forest for a large
public dataset5. The forest consists of 32 unbalanced
trees with 30K to 33K nodes each. A node comprises
four 8-byte values and hence fits into a single 56-byte
block. We load each tree into a separate ORAM and
evaluate 290,506 sample records; the performance re-
sults are given in Figure 11. Pyramid’s low online cost
5The Covertype dataset is available from the UCI Machine Learn-
ing Repository: https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/
covertype/ (accessed 18/05/2017)
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Figure 10: Sparse vector multiplication: CPU cycle over-
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Figure 11: Decision trees: CPU cycle overhead of
ORAM solutions normalized to the performance of the
insecure baseline.
shows again: Pyramid and Circuit incur three orders of
magnitude overhead on average, while 99% of all classi-
fications on average have only two orders of magnitude
overhead for Pyramid.
In summary, Pyramid ORAM can give orders of mag-
nitude lower access latencies than Circuit ORAM. In par-
ticular, Pyramid’s online access latencies are low. This
makes Pyramid the better choice for many applications
in practice.
9 Related work
Oblivious RAM The hierarchical constructions were
the first instantiations proposed for oblivious RAM [14].
Since then, many variations have been proposed which
alter hash tables, shuffling techniques, or assumptions on
the size of private memory [15, 17, 40, 53]. The hier-
archical construction by Kushilevitz et al. [25] has the
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best asymptotical performance among ORAMs for con-
stant private memory size. It uses the oblivious cuckoo
hashing scheme proposed by Goodrich and Mitzen-
macher [15]. In particular, the scheme relies on the
AKS sorting network [2], which is performed O(logN)
times for every level in the hierarchy. The AKS network,
though an optimal sorting network, in simplified form
has a high hidden constant of 6,100 [39]. Moreover, un-
til the hierarchy reaches the level that can hold at least
(logN)7 elements, every level is implemented using reg-
ular hash tables with buckets of size logN. Thus, AKS
only becomes practical for large data sizes.
Tree-based ORAM schemes, first proposed by Shi et
al. [10], are a fundamentally different paradigm. There
have been a number of follow-up constructions [26, 28,
50] that improve on the performance of ORAM schemes.
Most of these works focus on reducing bandwidth over-
head, often relying on non-constant private memory and
elements of size Ω(logN) or Ω((logN)2). We note that
such schemes can be modified to rely on constant pri-
vate memory by storing its content in an encrypted form
externally and accessing it also obliviously (e.g., a scan-
ning for every access). However, this transformation is
often expensive. For example, it increases the asymptot-
ical overhead of Path ORAM, because stash operations
now require using oblivious sorting [51, 52].
ORAMs have long held the promise to serve as build-
ing blocks for multi-party computation (MPC). Hence
some recent works focus on developing protocols with
small circuit complexity [52, 55], including the Cir-
cuit ORAM scheme [51] discussed in previous sections.
Some of the schemes that try to decrease circuit size
also have small private memory requirements, since any
“interesting” operation on private memory (e.g., sort-
ing) increases the size. However, not all ORAM designs
that target MPC can be used in our client-server model.
For example, the work by Zahur et al. [55] optimizes
a square-root ORAM [14] assuming that each party can
store a permutation of the elements.
Memory Side-channel Protection for Hardware
Rane et al. [41] investigated compiler-based techniques
for removing secret-dependent accesses in the code run-
ning on commodity hardware. Experimentally, they
showed that Path ORAM is not suitable in this setting
due to its requirements on large private memory, showing
that naive scanning performs better for small datasets.
Ring ORAM [28] optimizes parameters of Path
ORAM and uses an XOR technique on the server to de-
crease the bandwidth cost. As a case study, Ren et al.
estimate the performance of Ring ORAM if used on se-
cure processors assuming 64-byte element size. The de-
sign assumes non-constant size on-chip memory that can
fit the stash, a path of the tree (logarithmic in N) and the
position map at a certain recursion level. Ascend [11] is
a design for a secure processor that accesses code and
data through Path ORAM. As a result, Ascend relies
on on-chip private memory that is large enough to store
the stash and a path internally (i.e., O(logN)). PHAN-
TOM [30] is a processor design with an oblivious mem-
ory controller that also relies on Path ORAM, storing the
stash in trusted memory and using 1KB–4KB elements.
Fletcher et al. [12] improve on this using smaller ele-
ments, but they also assume large on-chip private mem-
ory. Other hardware designs optimized for Path ORAM
exist [13, 20, 43]. Sanctum [9] is a secure processor de-
sign related to Intel SGX. Other than SGX, it provides
private cache partitions for enclaves, stores enclave page-
tables in enclaves, and dispatches corresponding page
faults and other exceptions directly to in-enclave han-
dlers. This largely prevent malicious software (includ-
ing the OS) from inferring enclave memory access pat-
terns. However, it does not provide additional protection
against a hardware attacker.
Recent work also addresses SGX’s side channel prob-
lem in software: Shih et al. [48] proposed executing
sensitive code within Intel TSX transactions in order to
suppress and detect leaky page faults. Gruss et al. [19]
preload sensitive code and data within TSX transac-
tions in order to prevent leaky cache misses. Ohri-
menko et al. [36] manually protect a set of machine
learning algorithms against memory-based side-channel
attacks, applying high-level algorithmic changes and
low-level oblivious primitives. DR.SGX [6] aims to pro-
tect enclaves against cache side-channel attacks by fre-
quently re-randomizing data locations (except for small
stack-based data) at cache-line granularity. For this,
DR.SGX augments a program’s memory accesses at
compile time. DR.SGX incurs a reported mean over-
head of 3.39x–9.33x, depending on re-randomization
frequency. DR.SGX does not provide strong guarantees;
it can be seen as an ad-hoc ORAM construction that may
induce enough noise to protect against certain software
attacks. ZeroTrace [45] is an oblivious “memory con-
troller” for enclaves. It implements Path ORAM and Cir-
cuit ORAM to obliviously access data stored in untrusted
memory and on disk; only the client’s position map and
stash are kept in enclave memory and are accessed obliv-
iously using scanning and conditional x86 instructions.
Routing and Hash Tables The probabilistic routing
network in Section 4 belongs to the class of unbuffered
delta networks [38]. The functionality of our network is
different as instead of dropping the elements that could
not be routed, we label them as spilled (i.e., tagged false)
and carry them to the output. Probably the closest to
ours, is the network based on switches with multiple
links studied by Kumar [24]. The network assumes that
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each switch of the first stage (input buckets in our case)
receives one packet, which is not the case in our work
where buckets may contain up to c elements. Moreover,
the corresponding analysis, similar to other analyses of
delta networks, focuses on approximating the through-
put of the network, while we are interested in the upper-
bound of the number on elements that are not routed.
The Zigzag hash table can be seen as a combination
of the load balancing strategy called Threshold(c) [1]
and Multilevel Adaptive Hashing [8]. In the former, ele-
ments spilled from a table with buckets of size c are re-
thrown into the same table, discarding the elements from
the previous throws. In Multilevel Adaptive Hashing, k
tables of different sizes with buckets of size 1 are used
to store elements. The insertion procedure is the same as
that for non-oblivious ZHT, that is elements that collide
in the first hash table are re-inserted into the next table.
Different from ZHTs, multilevel hashing non-obliviously
rebuilds its tables when the kth table overflows.
10 Conclusions
We presented Pyramid ORAM, a novel ORAM design
that targets modern SGX processors. Rigorous analysis
of Pyramid ORAM, as well as an evaluation of an opti-
mized implementation for x64 Skylake CPUs, shows that
Pyramid ORAM provides strong guarantees and practi-
cal performance while outperforming previous ORAM
designs in this setting either in asymptotical online com-
plexity or in practice.
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Figure 12: Oblivious Zigzag Hash Table Setup from Section 5.2. During the initial throw elements are allocated using
random hash functions. In phase 1 elements in H1 are routed with probabilistic routing network using hash function h1.
Element 1 could not be routed to its bucket and, hence, is greyed out (tagged false by the PRN). Hence, it is thrown
into the next table. In the next phases elements in H2 and H3 are routed according to h2 and h3, correspondingly.
Appendix
A Additional lemmas
Lemma 6. When throwing m elements in n buckets, each
with capacity c, the probability that a given bucket re-
ceives c or more elements is at most
(m
c
) 1
nc .
Proof. The probability that a bucket gets assigned c or
more elements is
m
∑
i=c
(
m
i
)
1
ni
(
1− 1
n
)m−i
=(
m
c
)
1
nc
m
∑
i=c
c!(m− c)!
i!(m− i)!
1
ni−c
(
1− 1
n
)m−i
=(
m
c
)
1
nc
m−c
∑
i=0
c!(m− c)!
(c+ i)!(m− c− i!)
1
ni
(
1− 1
n
)m−c−i
To prove the lemma, we show that the sum expression is
at most 1. Note that as long as the first component of the
sum is at most
(m−c
i
)
, we can use the binomial formula:
m−c
∑
i=0
(
m− c
i
)
1
ni
(
1− 1
n
)m−c−i
= 1
We now show that
(m−c
i
) ≥ c!(m−c)!(c+i)!(m−c−i!) for i ≥ 0 and
c≥ 1:
(m− c)!
i!(m− c− i)! ≥
c!(m− c)!
(c+ i)!(m− c− i)!
1
i!
≥ c!
(c+ i)!
=
1
(c+1) . . .(c+ i)
Lemma 7. The average number of elements that do not
get assigned to a bucket during the throw of m elements
into n buckets of size c is at most 1nc
( m
c+1
)
.
Proof. Let X j be a random variable that is 1 if there
is a collision on the jth inserted element, and 0 other-
wise. For the first c+1 elements, Pr[X1] = Pr[X2] = . . .=
Pr[Xc] = 0. For c+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we need to estimate the
probability that jth element is inserted in a bucket with at
least c elements. The probability of a given bucket hav-
ing c or more elements after j− 1 elements have been
inserted is given in Lemma 6. Hence,
Pr[X j]≤
(
j−1
c
)
1
nc
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Note that X j are independent. Then, expected number of
collisions is
µ = E
[
m
∑
j=1
X j
]
≤
m
∑
j=c+1
Pr[X j]≤
m−1
∑
j=c
(
j
c
)
1
nc
=
1
nc
m−1
∑
j=c
(
j
c
)
Using the fact that ∑m−1j=c
( j
c
)
=
( m
c+1
)
:
µ ≤ 1
nc
(
m
c+1
)
Lemma 8. The number of elements that are spilled dur-
ing the ith stage of the routing network of size n on input
of size m ≤ n is at most the number of elements that do
not fit into H1 of a ZHT when throwing m elements.
Proof. We are interested in counting the number of ele-
ments whose tag changes from true to false during the ith
stage of the probabilistic routing network and refer to
such elements as spilled during the ith stage.
Let hstart be the hash function that was used to dis-
tribute elements during the throw of n elements into the
input table of the network (i.e., the elements that did find
a spot in the table appear in buckets according to hstart )
and hend be the hash function of the network. Let || de-
note a concatenation of two bit strings.
Consider stage i of the network, 1 ≤ i ≤ logn. After
stage i, element e is assigned to a bucket a||b where a
are the first i bits of hstart(e) and b are the first logn− i
bits of hend(e). Now consider, a throw phase of m ele-
ments into a table of n buckets using the same hash func-
tion. Let us compare the number of elements assigned
to a particular bucket in each case. We argue that the
number in the former case is either the same as in the
latter case or smaller. Note that the elements that can
be assigned to a bucket is the same in both cases as ele-
ments are distributed across buckets using the same hash
function. However, some of the elements of the PRN
may have been lost in earlier stages (those that arrive to
the ith stage with the false tag) and have already been
counted towards the spill of an earlier stage. Since ele-
ments tagged false are disregarded by the network during
routing, ith stage may spill the same number of elements
as the hash table or less since there are less “live” (tagged
true) elements that reach their buckets.
Lemma 9. Consider the following allocation of n el-
ements into tables, each with n buckets of size c =
log logn. The elements are allocated uniformly at ran-
dom in the first table. The elements that do not fit into
the first table are allocated into the second table.
The number of elements that arrive into the second
table is at most n/(2e).
Proof. In Lemma 7 we showed that average number of
outgoing elements at level i is µi = 1nc
(
ini
c+1
)
. Hence, with
in1 = n
µ1 ≤ n
c+1
nc(c+1)!
=
n
(c+1)!
≤ n
2e logn
where we rely on (c + 1)! ≥ 2e logn (see below). If
n/(2e logn) is sufficiently large (e.g., n/(2e logn) ≥ 3s
where s is the security parameter), we can use Cher-
noff bounds to show that with probability exp(−µ1/3)
the number of spilled elements from the first level is no
more than 2µ1. Hence, in total the number of elements
that spill is at most:
n
e logn
≤ n
2e
If n is of moderate size (e.g., n≥ 210), we can use another
form of Chernoff bounds [33, Chapter 4] to show that
with probability 2−R the number of spilled elements from
the first level is no more than R≥ 6µ1, where 6µ1≥ s and
6µ1 ≤ n/2e.
Finally we show that for any a ≥ 10, (loga+ 1)! ≥
2ea:
(loga+1)!≥
√
2pi(loga+1)
(loga+1)loga+1
eloga+1
≥√
2pi(loga+1)
(loga+1)loga+1
3loga+1
≥√
2pi(loga+1)
2log(loga+1)(loga+1)
2(loga+1) log3
≥
2ea
Lemma 10. Consider the process in Lemma 9 but after
the first throw, the first table is routed through the rout-
ing network from Section 4 and elements spilled from the
network are also thrown into the second table. The ele-
ments of the second table are routed as well and spilled
elements are thrown into the third table, and so on. The
number of elements that arrive into the third table is at
most n/(2e).
Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that the total overflow
from throwing the elements and routing them through the
network is at most logn times the overflow from the orig-
inal throw. Consider the proof of Lemma 9. The second
table receives at most
2n logn
2e logn
=
n
e
20
number of elements. Then the average overflow accord-
ing to Lemma 7 is
1
nc
( n
e
c+1
)
≤ n
c+1
ncec+12e logn
=
n
2lognec+2
≤ n
4e logn
We can again use Chernoff bound to show that the num-
ber of elements that arrive into the next level will be
at most 2 logn factor away from the above expression.
Hence, the number of elements that arrive into the third
table is
2n logn
4e logn
=
n
2e
Lemma 11. Consider the following allocation of m ≤
n/(2e) elements into k tables, each with n buckets of
size c = log logn. The elements are allocated uniformly
at random in the first table. The elements that do not
fit into the first table are allocated into the second ta-
ble and so on, until there are no elements left. Then,
k = O(log logn) is sufficient to allocate all elements.
Proof. We analyze the process using Poisson random
variables as an approximation of the balls-and-bins ap-
proximation process [33, Chapter 5]. Recall that as long
as event’s probability is monotonically decreasing or in-
creasing in the number of elements, the event that hap-
pens with probability ε in the Poisson case has proba-
bility at most 2ε in the exact case. Let Zi be a Poisson
random variable that measures the number of elements
in a bucket after a random throw. Let α be the mean of
Zi. Recall that,
Pr(Zi ≥ c)≤ e
−α(eα)c
cc
Hence, the number of n buckets that will have at least
c elements is ne−α(eα)c/cc. It is known, that with
very high probability no bucket has more than O(logn)
elements, hence, the number of overflow elements is
(n logn)e−α(eα)c/cc. We now show that as long as
α ≤ 1/(2e), we require O(log logn) rounds until no over-
flow occurs. After the first throw, the overflow is
(n logn)
(eα)c+1
(c+1)c+1
≤ n
2c+1e logn
(1)
where with c = dlog logne, logn/(c+ 1)c+1 ≤ 1/e (see
below). Hence, in the next round:
(n logn)
(e/(2c+1e logn))c+1
(c+1)c+1
≤ n
2(c+1)2(logn)c+2e
Then for the ith round the overflow is:
n
2(c+1)i(logn)(c+1)i−1e
Hence, after at most O(log logn) rounds the above ex-
pression is less than 1.
We are left to show that as long as a ≥ 8, a/(loga+
1)(loga+1) ≤ 1/e. In the following lemma we require a
similar result but for a2 in the numerator. Hence, instead
we show that a2/(loga+1)(loga+1) ≤ 1/e:
a2
(loga+1)(loga+1)
=
1
2log(loga+1)(loga+1)−2loga
≤
1
2log(loga+1)+loga(log(loga+1)−2)
≤ 1
loga+1
≤ 1
4
≤ 1
e
Lemma 12. Consider the process in Lemma 11 but after
the first throw, the first table is routed through the rout-
ing network from Section 4 and elements spilled from the
network are also thrown into the second table. The ele-
ments of the second table are routed as well and spilled
elements are thrown into the third table, and so on. Then,
O(log logn) rounds are still sufficient to avoid overflow
in the last round.
Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that the total overflow
from throwing the elements and routing them through the
network is at most logn times the overflow from the orig-
inal throw. Consider the proof of Lemma 11. In Equa-
tion 1, we can replace n with n logn to account for the
buckets in each round of the network. This would result
in the spill of
n
2c+1e logn
in the first round and
n
2(c+1)ie
in the ith round. Hence, O(log logn) rounds are still suf-
ficient to fit all the elements.
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